Six months ago, Iran was supposed to collapse. Here’s what happened instead

A campaign designed to crush Tehran in two weeks has become a costly war that is accelerating the decline of US influence August 28–29 marks exactly six months since the start of the full-scale military campaign – or, more accurately, the entirely unprovoked US-Israeli aggression against Iran.

The plan was based on the logic of a “decapitation strike” : eliminate the country’s leadership, paralyze the government, and push the population toward a “color revolution.” West Jerusalem assumed that the campaign would last no more than two weeks, after which Tehran would be forced to accept the terms imposed on it.

That was the rationale behind the effort to eliminate key figures.

Ali Khamenei was killed on the very first day of the aggression, on the morning of February 28, along with several other senior officials.

On March 17, a strike on the outskirts of Tehran killed Ali Larijani – the former parliament speaker, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, nuclear negotiator, and longtime Khamenei adviser.

He was one of the few figures in the Iranian establishment who connected the security apparatus with the diplomatic corps.

Following Khamenei’s death, Larijani had effectively become the system’s chief coordinator.

By killing him, the United States and Israel hoped to deliver a final blow to Iran’s decision-making structure.

Yet the state was not paralyzed.

The physical elimination of Iran’s leaders failed to produce the desired result.

The chain of command did not collapse, the security services did not defect, and the country did not capitulate.

Authority was quickly redistributed between the Supreme National Security Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The IRGC emerged as an even more influential center of military and political power.

The deaths of the country’s top officials altered Iran’s internal balance, but they did not destroy the system.